8:01 AM 5/17/2020 - Another indication that Sars-Cov-2 is man made: "Coronavirus did not come from animals in Wuhan market, study finds". | "SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? | bioRxiv"
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https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/801-am-5172020-another-indication-that.html
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Another indication that Sars-Cov-2 is man made: "Coronavirus did not come from animals in Wuhan market, study finds". | "SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? | bioRxiv"
"Coronavirus did not come from a lab but was brought to the Wuhan wet market by humans, according to new research published this month.
Scientists examining how to stop future pandemics found
the virus that causes Covid-19 had already pre-adapted to human transmission and was ‘imported’ into the market by humans.
The report’s abstract read: ‘We were surprised to find that SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) resembles SARS-CoV in the late phase of the 2003 epidemic after SARS-CoV had developed several advantageous adaptations for human transmission.
‘Our observations suggest that by the time SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in late 2019,
it was already pre-adapted to human transmission to an extent similar to late epidemic SARS-CoV.
‘However,
no precursors or branches of evolution stemming from a less human-adapted SARS-CoV-2-like virus have been detected.
‘The sudden appearance of a highly infectious SARS-CoV-2 presents a major cause for concern that should motivate stronger international efforts to identify the source and prevent near future re-emergence.’
However, tracking how diseases leap from species to species suggests
it was ‘imported into the market by humans’, the team said."
___________________________________________________________________- SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? - Google Search https://www.google.com/search?q=SARS-CoV-2+is+well+adapted+for+humans.+What+does+this+mean+for+re-emergence%3F&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS733US733&oq=SARS-CoV-2+is+well+adapted+for+humans.+What+does+this+mean+for+re-emergence%3F&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i65.3261j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 …
- SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.01.073262v1 …
- Coronavirus did not come from animals in Wuhan market, study finds https://metro.co.uk/2020/05/17/coronavirus-did-not-come-animals-wuhan-market-study-finds-12715779/?ito=article.desktop.share.top.twitter … via @MetroUK
- President weakens US counterintelligence and promotes armed protests https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/498152-president-weakens-us-counterintelligence-and-promotes-armed-protests#.XsCMTFgkdOg.twitter …
- 36.4% of these patients showed neurological symptoms, and that those symptoms were even more common in severe COVID cases. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-junction/202005/covid-19-is-not-just-respiratory-illness …
- “According to the research from China [I do not trust it - M.N.], COVID-19 cannot be transmitted to farmed animals,” says Prof Dr Yong Poovorawan -
Thai virology guru says meat is safe for consumption despite COVID-19 outbreak - The Cattle Site https://www.thecattlesite.com/news/55310/thai-virology-guru-says-meat-is-safe-for-consumption-despite-covid19-outbreak/ … - Thai virology guru says meat is safe for consumption despite COVID-19 outbreak - The Cattle Site https://www.thecattlesite.com/news/55310/thai-virology-guru-says-meat-is-safe-for-consumption-despite-covid19-outbreak/ …
- he data might back up other findings that say the virus may have jumped to humans as early as October. https://bgr.com/2020/05/16/coronavirus-patient-zero-france-finds-evidence-pointing-to-november/ …
- New research indicates that COVID-19 may have been spreading in France in mid-November when some patients already had atypical pneumonia that’s consistent with a positive COVID-19 diagnosis. https://bgr.com/2020/05/16/coronavirus-patient-zero-france-finds-evidence-pointing-to-november/ …
- New study may change our understanding of the coronavirus’ origins – BGR https://bgr.com/2020/05/16/coronavirus-patient-zero-france-finds-evidence-pointing-to-november/ …
- What is a coronavirus "super-spreading" event? https://www.cbsnews.com/news/super-spreader-coronavirus/ … via @CBSHealth
- Experts gather in Germany at foodborne outbreak meeting | Food Safety News https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/11/experts-gather-in-germany-at-foodborne-outbreak-meeting/ …
- Philippines authorities seize smuggled pork from China https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2019/10/28/Philippines-authorities-seize-smuggled-pork-from-China …
- Coronavirus: Ex-Trump lawyer Cohen being released from prison amid virus concern https://www.wpxi.com/news/trending/coronavirus-live-updates-us-death-toll-nears-31000-nationwide-cases-approach-640000/MSDMX35HEFA5PNP3UOZZ7X3MZ4/ …
- https://p.dw.com/p/3bas2?maca=en-Twitter-sharing … German farmers sweat as pig fever reaches western Poland
- More than 6,500 workers in large meatpacking companies have already been infected. At least 25 meatpacking workers in the US have already died of COVID-19. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/05/11/geme-m11.html …
- The rapid spread of the coronavirus among abattoir workers is an international phenomenon. As the World Socialist Web Site reported, US slaughterhouses are currently hotspots of the pandemic. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/05/11/geme-m11.html …
- Hundreds of COVID-19 infections in German meatpacking plants - World Socialist Web Site https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/05/11/geme-m11.html …
- Virus Hotspots Grow in Meat Plants From Germany to Brazil https://finance.yahoo.com/news/virus-hotspots-grow-meat-plants-012756023.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw … via @YahooFinance
- Indiana pork plant second to test all workers for COVID-19 https://www.theindychannel.com/news/coronavirus/covid-19-healthcare/indiana-pork-plant-second-to-test-all-workers-for-covid-19 …
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Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks℠ | InBrief |
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SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans. What does this mean for re-emergence? | bioRxiv | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
AbstractIn a side-by-side comparison of evolutionary dynamics between the 2019/2020 SARS-CoV-2 and the 2003 SARS-CoV, we were surprised to find that SARS-CoV-2 resembles SARS-CoV in the late phase of the 2003 epidemic after SARS-CoV had developed several advantageous adaptations for human transmission. Our observations suggest that by the time SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in late 2019, it was already pre-adapted to human transmission to an extent similar to late epidemic SARS-CoV. However, no precursors or branches of evolution stemming from a less human-adapted SARS-CoV-2-like virus have been detected. The sudden appearance of a highly infectious SARS-CoV-2 presents a major cause for concern that should motivate stronger international efforts to identify the source and prevent near future re-emergence. Any existing pools of SARS-CoV-2 progenitors would be particularly dangerous if similarly well adapted for human transmission. To look for clues regarding intermediate hosts, we analyze recent key findings relating to how SARS-CoV-2 could have evolved and adapted for human transmission, and examine the environmental samples from the Wuhan Huanan seafood market. Importantly, the market samples are genetically identical to human SARS-CoV-2 isolates and were therefore most likely from human sources. We conclude by describing and advocating for measured and effective approaches implemented in the 2002-2004 SARS outbreaks to identify lingering population(s) of progenitor virus. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Coronavirus did not come from animals in Wuhan market, study finds | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Coronavirus did not come from a lab but was brought to the Wuhan wet market by humans, according to new research published this month.
Scientists examining how to stop future pandemics found the virus that causes Covid-19 had already pre-adapted to human transmission and was imported into the market by humans. The team said that because the market was decontaminated so quickly after the virus flared, it would not be possible to pinpoint how it jumped from bats to humans but stressed it would be safer to more extensively limit human activity that leads to frequent or prolonged contact with wild animals and their habitats. The paper, titled SARS-CoV-2 is well adapted for humans, was written by Shing Hei Zhan, Benjamin Deverman and Yujia Alina Chan although it has yet to be peer reviewed.
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The team took a side-by-side comparison at how coronaviruses evolved looking at SARS and what we know as Covid-19.Visit our live blog for the latest updates: Coronavirus news live The reports abstract read: We were surprised to find that SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) resembles SARS-CoV in the late phase of the 2003 epidemic after SARS-CoV had developed several advantageous adaptations for human transmission. Our observations suggest that by the time SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in late 2019, it was already pre-adapted to human transmission to an extent similar to late epidemic SARS-CoV. However, no precursors or branches of evolution stemming from a less human-adapted SARS-CoV-2-like virus have been detected. The sudden appearance of a highly infectious SARS-CoV-2 presents a major cause for concern that should motivate stronger international efforts to identify the source and prevent near future re-emergence. The paper, published on biorxiv.org, concluded that there was still considerable debate among the scientific community, as well as the wider public, as to whether the coronavirus originated from the Wuhan market. Chinas disease control website, said the first sources were detected in samples taken from the wet market and originated from animals sold there. However, tracking how diseases leap from species to species suggests it was imported into the market by humans, the team said.
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The scientists looked for clues in samples collected from the market in January, 2020 and found a striking contrast to those collected in the wake of the SARS outbreak of 2002-2004 as there was no animal sampling prior to the shut down and sanitisation of the market was reported.This makes it difficult to trace Covid-19 of the 70 samples collected from wild animal vendors it is unclear whether the latter samples are from animals, humans, and/or the environment and only four, have passable coverage of SARS-CoV-2 genomes for analysis. The team still think the samples provide enough data to suggest it was unlikely coronavirus originated from an intermediate animal host, particularly if the most recent common ancestor jumped into humans as early as October, 2019 and that the SARS-CoV-2 genomes in the market samples were most likely from humans infected with SARS-CoV-2 who were vendors or visitors at the market. The findings will only fuel fire among those calling for an international inquiry into the pandemic. MP Bob Seely, a member of the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee said: We need to get to the bottom of many things in relation to Covid-19. We need to know where this virus began, why we were told at one time there was no human transmission, and what was the role of the Chinese Communist Party. Get in touch with our news team by emailing us at webnews@metro.co.uk. For more stories like this, check our news page.
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8:26 PM 5/16/2020 » Boy, 9, in France dies from rare childhood illness after contracting COVID-19 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/coronavirus-news-review-in-brief-boy-9.html
______________________________________________________________ CoronaVirus News Review In Brief _________________________________________________________________
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Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID19) outbreak: Could pigs be vectors for human infections? - Opriessnig - 2020 - Xenotransplantation | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Coronaviruses (CoVs) have recently received an extraordinary level of global attention due to the discovery of a novel high pathogenic human coronavirus (CoV) in China in December 2019.1 CoVs are positivesense RNA viruses that belong to the subfamily Orthocoronavirinae in the family Coronaviridae (Source: International Committee on Taxonomy of VirusesICTV, Taxonomy history: Orthocoronavirinae. Accessed January 24, 2020). This family can be divided into four genera, αCoVs, βCoVs, γCoVs, and δCoVs.2 CoV in humans are common (Table 1), often associated with mild cold symptoms, and include the αCoVs HCoV229E3 and HCoVNL63,4 and the βCoVs HCoVOC435 and HCoVHKU1.6 In addition, to date three high pathogenic CoVs (all βCoVs) are recognized in humans and characterized by moderate (MERSCoV) or high (SARSCoV, SARSCoV2) transmission rates and association with mortality (Table 2).
Pigs play a major role in xenotransplantation due to their organ similarity with humans. Pigs are susceptible to several CoVs including the αCoVs transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV),15 porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV),16 porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV),17 and the recently emerging swine acute diarrhea syndrome coronavirus (SADSCoV)18, 19 which like SARSCoV or MERSCoV appears to have originated from bats. Besides these αCoVs, pigs are also susceptible to a βCoV, porcine hemagglutinating encephalomyelitis virus (PHEV),20 and a δCoV, porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV)21 (Table 1). As outlined, pigs have their own range of CoVs and humans have their own range of CoVs with no apparent overlap. It is however interesting to note that CoVs in humans mainly target the respiratory tract whereas CoVs in pigs mainly target the enteric system (Table 1). In pigs, there is only a single CoV associated with respiratory infections, PRCV, commonly resulting in mild disease and lesions22, 23 and hence not considered of importance to pork producers. Prevention in the form of vaccines is not in place for PRCV. Only few studies have investigated if pigs can become infected with SARSCoV or MERSCoV and hence have determined if pigs could be a source of infection for humans. During a survey involving six domestic animal species including pigs and 242 individual animals in China, SARSCoV RNA was detected in a single pig.24 Furthermore, two pigs among the 242 animals surveyed were SARSCoV antibody positive. The authors concluded that SARSCoV interspecies transmission events occur and possibly pose a risk to humans.24 In another study, 6weekold pigs and chickens were experimentally infected with SARSCoV using intravenous, intranasal, ocular, and oral routes.25 None of the animals developed clinical signs or lesions. Virus isolation was unsuccessful; RNA was detected in blood from pigs and chickens and virusneutralizing antibodies were detected in two pigs. The authors concluded that chickens and pigs likely do not play a role in virus amplification.25 Recognized natural hosts of MERSCoV include dromedaries and camels.26, 27 To further investigate the potential of other species to amplify MERSCoV, llamas, pigs, sheep, and horses were experimentally infected.28 Specifically, these species received MERSCoV intranasally using a mucosal atomization device. Nasal and rectal swabs were collected over time, and MERSCoV RNA and antigen and virus could be detected in nasal swabs from llamas and pigs. The authors concluded that MERSCoV circulation in animals other than dromedaries, such as llamas and pigs, is not negligible.28 From the obtained data available today, it would appear pigs can carry SARSCoV and develop antibodies. Furthermore, evidence exists that pigs can amplify MERSCoV. So far there is no evidence that pigs can become infected with SARSCoV2 or are capable to amplify the virus. However, as the SARSCoV2 outbreak has just emerged and is ongoing any testing currently focuses on identifying infected people to prevent further humantohuman transmissions. Notably, it was reported that SARSCoV2 could use angiotensinconverting enzyme 2 (ACE2) from four animal species including porcine ACE2 as the receptor to enter the cell in vitro,29 possibly suggesting that pigs may be susceptible to SARSCoV2 infection. Theoretically, if pigs can be infected with SARCCoV2 and also amplify it, the virus would likely be present in the respiratory tract of pigs so lungs or nasal swabs would need to be tested. In human CoV studies, it has been shown that RNA can be detected by PCR in serum or plasma obtained from patients with SARSCoV, MERSCoV, and also SARSCoV2 infections.30 In addition, SARSCoV2 RNA was also detected in a patient's stool sample.31 It is presently unknown if these events resemble just leakage of viral particles or fragments or if the virus can replicate outside the respiratory tract.30 The risk associated with human blood for transmission to other people is unknown, but blood donations are not practiced in highrisk areas where infections are ongoing and it is recommended to measure the body temperature of blood donors prior to blood donation. Interspecies transmission from humans to other species including pigs likely requires a close contact with infected people. A dog from Tai Hang, Islands District, Hong Kong, living in the same household as a confirmed COVID19 patient was found SARSCoV2 RTPCR positive on nasal swab and oral samples without showing any clinical signs beginning of February 2020 (Source: https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Reviewreport/Review?page_refer=MapFullEventReport&reportid=33455). While most pets often have close very contact to their owner, the situation with pigs is different. In China, the origin of SARSCoV2, where most infections in humans have been reported as of now, pig caretakers must be free of signs for COVID19 before being allowed to enter pig farms, as one part of the national largescale quarantine policy (Source: https://necsi.edu/theeffectoftravelrestrictionsonthedomesticspreadofthewuhancoronavirus2019ncov). Furthermore, viral spillovers from one species into another species are further promoted by high mutation rates allowing the virus to overcome hostspecific defenses. From sequences currently available on SARSCoV2, the mutation rate does not appear to be high (Source: https://nextstrain.org/groups/blab/sarslikecov). Based on today's knowledge, the risk of acquiring a SARSCoV2 infection while undergoing a transplantation procedure using porcinederived materials should be considered low but likely needs to be properly assessed. Until this is the case, donor pigs can simply be tested by PCR for the presence of SARSCoV2 viral RNA or once available by serology for antibodies to further rule out any infection. This practice is currently already in place for human blood donors in Wuhan and Hubei Province in China.30 In summary, SARSCoV2 is emerging and spreading at a high rate in the human population. Due to the large number of infected people often with high virus loads, SARSCoV2 could potentially spill over in other species including pigs and this should be monitored closely. Evidence from SARSCoV would suggest that it is likely to detect SARSCoV2 RNA in pigs but perhaps unlikely that the virus would be amplified in pigs. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2:27 PM 5/16/2020 - "Pig coronavirus potentially harmful to humans" - Is Sars-Cov-2 a Bioweapon engineered on the basis of Pig Coronaviruses? | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/pig-coronavirus-potentially-harmful-to.html
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Is Sars-Cov-2 a Bioweapon engineered on the basis of Pig Coronaviruses?
"Pig coronavirus potentially harmful to humans" It might or might not be made in a Lab, but it is the hypothetical intentional and deliberate, aggressively purported USE, this what gives it the potential properties of a Bioweapon. For example, stick is just a stick, but it can be used as a weapon. The recent scientific studies indicate that Sars-Cov-2 does not come from a bat or a pangolin - see the previous posts. The domestic or wild pigs look much more likely as the source, and the deliberately introduced mutation, the weaponization cannot be ruled out at this point. Many scientists, Luk Montagnier among them, and the ordinary folks have the impression, that this virus was manipulated. We do have to consider this as the quite realistic possibility. SARS CoV, the porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), and transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) "show striking pathogenetic similarities". Pig Coronaviruses are able to enter the human cells in vitro and have the potential to jump to humans, found the researchers. I think, this already had happened, and this is exactly what Covid-19 is about. How else can we explain the epidemic of this illness and deaths at the pork plants? We absolutely need the targeted research in this area. Is the pork industry preventing these research efforts to protect their financial interests? We have to look into this. We have to consider the Bioterrorism aspects too: in Muslim cultures the pigs are considered the "unclean" animals, and the consumption of pork is prohibited. Are the terrorists trying to drive this point in and to "teach a lesson"? We have to look into this also. As a precaution, stop eating pork and pork products! Michael Novakhov 2:27 PM 5/16/2020 ______________________________________________________________________________ Links and References Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks | InBrief | -
Mike Nova's Shared NewsLinks Review In 250 Brief Posts -
» mikenov on Twitter: We now know for sure that porcine deltacoronavirus can bind to and enter cells of humans and birds, she said. Our next step is to look at susceptibility can sick pigs transmit their virus to chickens, or vice versa, and to humans?
16/05/20 13:50 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) We now know for sure that porcine deltacoronavirus can bind to and enter cells of humans and birds, she said. Our next step is to look at susceptibility can sick pigs transmit their virus to chickens, or vice versa, and to humans? ...
» mikenov on Twitter: Were very concerned about emerging coronaviruses and worry about the harm they can do to animals and their potential to jump to humans, co-author Linda Saif, PhD healio.com/infectious-dis
16/05/20 13:49 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Were very concerned about emerging coronaviruses and worry about the harm they can do to animals and their potential to jump to humans, co-author Linda Saif, PhD healio.com/infectious-dis Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020...
» mikenov on Twitter: #CDC #CIA #FBI #DIA: From that point, its just a matter of whether it can replicate within the cells and cause disease in those animals and humans, Scott Kenney PhD assistant professor and researcher in The Ohio State University...
16/05/20 13:48 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #CDC #CIA #FBI #DIA: From that point, its just a matter of whether it can replicate within the cells and cause disease in those animals and humans, Scott Kenney PhD assistant professor and researcher in The Ohio State University... sa...
» mikenov on Twitter: By showing for the first time that the virus could bind to the receptor in human cells, the researchers said they demonstrated its ability for cross-species transmission. healio.com/infectious-dis
16/05/20 13:43 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) By showing for the first time that the virus could bind to the receptor in human cells, the researchers said they demonstrated its ability for cross-species transmission. healio.com/infectious-dis Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May ...
» mikenov on Twitter: researchers from The Ohio State University and Utrecht University in the Netherlands reported that PDCoV is capable of infecting human, cat and chicken cells in a lab. - healio.com/infectious-dis
16/05/20 13:43 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) researchers from The Ohio State University and Utrecht University in the Netherlands reported that PDCoV is capable of infecting human, cat and chicken cells in a lab. - healio.com/infectious-dis Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th,...
» Pig coronavirus potentially harmful to humans
16/05/20 13:42 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . Scientists are concerned that a recently discovered coronavirus could emerge to cause outbreaks in humans. The virus, porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV), was first identified in in 2012 in Chinese pigs ...
» mikenov on Twitter: May 18, 2018 - Scientists are concerned that a recently discovered coronavirus could emerge to cause outbreaks in humans.The virus, porcine ...Coronavirus in pigs - Google Search google.com/search?q=Coron
16/05/20 13:39 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) May 18, 2018 - Scientists are concerned that a recently discovered coronavirus could emerge to cause outbreaks in humans.The virus, porcine ... Coronavirus in pigs - Google Search google.com/search?q=Coron Posted by mikenov on Saturday,...
» mikenov on Twitter: Coronavirus in pigs - Google Search google.com/search?q=Coron
16/05/20 13:39 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Coronavirus in pigs - Google Search google.com/search?q=Coron Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 5:39pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Biological warfare agents may be more potent than conventional and chemical weapons. During the past century, the progress made in biotechnology and ..biological warfare and bioterrorism - Google Search google.com/search?q=biolo
16/05/20 13:31 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Biological warfare agents may be more potent than conventional and chemical weapons. During the past century, the progress made in biotechnology and .. biological warfare and bioterrorism - Google Search google.com/search?q=biolo Posted...
» mikenov on Twitter: German researchers: Pigs, poultry not susceptible to COVID-19 - infected pork in germany - Google Search google.com/search?q=infec
16/05/20 13:30 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) German researchers: Pigs, poultry not susceptible to COVID-19 - infected pork in germany - Google Search google.com/search?q=infec Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 5:30pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine ... google.com/search?newwind
16/05/20 13:29 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine ... google.com/search?newwind Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 5:...
» mikenov on Twitter: Linda Saif, virologist and distinguished professor in the Food Animal Health Research Program at The Ohio State University, says this is how coronaviruses acquire the ability to infect different tissues and to infect different species
16/05/20 13:28 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Linda Saif, virologist and distinguished professor in the Food Animal Health Research Program at The Ohio State University, says this is how coronaviruses acquire the ability to infect different tissues and to infect different species of...
» mikenov on Twitter: SARS-CoV-2 is part of a third distinct group of coronaviruses (beta CoV) and is genetically and antigenically distinct from these two swine coronaviruses, she adds. nationalhogfarmer.com/livestock/can-
16/05/20 13:24 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) SARS-CoV-2 is part of a third distinct group of coronaviruses (beta CoV) and is genetically and antigenically distinct from these two swine coronaviruses, she adds. nationalhogfarmer.com/livestock/can- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May...
» mikenov on Twitter: Coronavirus, a word quite familiar to the global swine industry as transmissible gastroenteritis virus, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus and porcine deltacorona virus are all coronaviruses that do impact pig health. nationalhogfarmer.co
16/05/20 13:22 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Coronavirus, a word quite familiar to the global swine industry as transmissible gastroenteritis virus, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus and porcine deltacorona virus are all coronaviruses that do impact pig health. nationalhogfarmer.com/...
» mikenov on Twitter: Can pigs catch COVID-19? nationalhogfarmer.com/livestock/can-
16/05/20 13:21 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Can pigs catch COVID-19? nationalhogfarmer.com/livestock/can- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 5:21pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Coronavirus as swine transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Google Search google.com/search?newwind
16/05/20 13:21 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Coronavirus as swine transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Google Search google.com/search?newwind Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 5:21pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV ... gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV - Google Search google.com/search?q=The+p
16/05/20 13:19 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV ... gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV - Google Search google.com/search?q=The+p Posted by mikenov on Saturda...
» mikenov on Twitter: The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV in its primary replication in lung. grantome.com/grant/NIH/
16/05/20 13:08 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV in its primary replication in lung. grantome.com/grant/NIH/R0...
» Porcine Respiratory Coronavirus as a SARS Model
16/05/20 12:55 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly emerging global disease of humans with a major economic impact and significant bioterrorism potential caused by a new strain of coronavirus (CoV). T...
» mikenov on Twitter: Porcine Respiratory Coronavirus as a SARS Model - Linda Saif grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-
16/05/20 12:54 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Porcine Respiratory Coronavirus as a SARS Model - Linda Saif grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:54pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: SARS CoV, the porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), and transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) show striking pathogenetic similarities - Google Search google.com/search?q=SARS+
16/05/20 12:51 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) SARS CoV, the porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), and transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) show striking pathogenetic similarities - Google Search google.com/search?q=SARS+ Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:51pm mikenov ...
» mikenov on Twitter: The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV ... gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV google.com/search?q=Sars-
16/05/20 12:47 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV ... gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV google.com/search?q=Sars- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 202...
» mikenov on Twitter: Sars-cov-2, Porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV), and Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) - Google Search google.com/search?q=Sars-
16/05/20 12:46 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Sars-cov-2, Porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV), and Transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV) - Google Search google.com/search?q=Sars- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:46pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) - Google Search google.com/search?newwind
16/05/20 12:37 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) - Google Search google.com/search?newwind Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:37pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Engineering TGEV coronavirus: The Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus has been engineered as an expression vector. The vector was constructed by replacing the nonessential 3a and 3b ORF, which is driven en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss
16/05/20 12:36 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Engineering TGEV coronavirus: The Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus has been engineered as an expression vector. The vector was constructed by replacing the nonessential 3a and 3b ORF, which is driven en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss P...
» mikenov on Twitter: Coronaviruses enter the host by first attaching to the host cell using the spike glycoprotein. The S protein interacts with the porcine aminopeptidase N (pAPN), a cellular receptor. The same cell receptor is also a point of contact for
16/05/20 12:32 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Coronaviruses enter the host by first attaching to the host cell using the spike glycoprotein. The S protein interacts with the porcine aminopeptidase N (pAPN), a cellular receptor. The same cell receptor is also a point of contact for H...
» mikenov on Twitter: Other coronaviruses that belong to the species Alphacoronavirus 1 are Feline coronavirus, Canine coronavirus and Feline infectious peritonitis virus. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss
16/05/20 12:30 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Other coronaviruses that belong to the species Alphacoronavirus 1 are Feline coronavirus, Canine coronavirus and Feline infectious peritonitis virus. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:30pm m...
» mikenov on Twitter: Transmissible gastroenteritis virus or Transmissible gastroenteritis coronavirus (TGEV) is a coronavirus which infects pigs. It is an enveloped, positive-sense, single-stranded RNA virus which enters its host cell by binding to the APN
16/05/20 12:29 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Transmissible gastroenteritis virus or Transmissible gastroenteritis coronavirus (TGEV) is a coronavirus which infects pigs. It is an enveloped, positive-sense, single-stranded RNA virus which enters its host cell by binding to the APN r...
» mikenov on Twitter: Transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss
16/05/20 12:27 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmiss Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:27pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics sciencedirect.com/topics/immunol
16/05/20 12:27 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics sciencedirect.com/topics/immunol Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:27pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Coronavirus as swine transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Google Search google.com/search?newwind
16/05/20 12:25 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Coronavirus as swine transmissible gastroenteritis virus - Google Search google.com/search?newwind Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:25pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: wild pigs and boars at wuhan wet market images.app.goo.gl/nQCRLhrwNMSscJ
16/05/20 12:11 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) wild pigs and boars at wuhan wet market images.app.goo.gl/nQCRLhrwNMSscJ Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:11pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: wild pigs and boars at wuhan wet market - Google Search google.com/search?q=wild+
16/05/20 12:06 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) wild pigs and boars at wuhan wet market - Google Search google.com/search?q=wild+ Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:06pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy reut.rs/2ImreO8
16/05/20 12:00 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy reut.rs/2ImreO8 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 4:00pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Jan 31, 2020 - Two completely different viral outbreaks are making international headlines and originating in China one affects people and one affects pigs. - Coronavirus and Swine Fever epidemics at once - Google Search google.com/
16/05/20 11:45 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Jan 31, 2020 - Two completely different viral outbreaks are making international headlines and originating in China one affects people and one affects pigs. - Coronavirus and Swine Fever epidemics at once - Google Search google.com/sea...
» mikenov on Twitter: Meat processing plants are just one example: Prisons, homeless shelters, long-term care facilities, and cruise ships all follow a similar pattern. If you stick a bunch of people in close quarters for long periods of time, the virus wil
16/05/20 11:42 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Meat processing plants are just one example: Prisons, homeless shelters, long-term care facilities, and cruise ships all follow a similar pattern. If you stick a bunch of people in close quarters for long periods of time, the virus will ...
» mikenov on Twitter: Why Meatpacking Plants Have Become Covid-19 Hot Spots | WIRED wired.com/story/why-meat
16/05/20 11:42 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Why Meatpacking Plants Have Become Covid-19 Hot Spots | WIRED wired.com/story/why-meat Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 3:42pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt-
16/05/20 11:38 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 3:38pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: New Bioweapon: combination complex of swine flu + swine fever + Sars-cov-2 - Google Search google.com/search?q=New+B
16/05/20 11:35 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) New Bioweapon: combination complex of swine flu + swine fever + Sars-cov-2 - Google Search google.com/search?q=New+B Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 3:35pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Here's What Makes Coronavirus and African Swine Fever Different | Pork Business porkbusiness.com/article/heres-
16/05/20 11:35 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Here's What Makes Coronavirus and African Swine Fever Different | Pork Business porkbusiness.com/article/heres- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 3:35pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Classic and African swine fever in China - Google Search google.com/search?q=Class
16/05/20 11:30 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Classic and African swine fever in China - Google Search google.com/search?q=Class Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 3:30pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Swine fever causes fever, skin lesions, convulsions, Splenic Infarctions and usually (particularly in young animals) death within 15 days. The disease has acute and chronic forms, and can range from severe, with high mortality, to mild
16/05/20 11:24 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Swine fever causes fever, skin lesions, convulsions, Splenic Infarctions and usually (particularly in young animals) death within 15 days. The disease has acute and chronic forms, and can range from severe, with high mortality, to mild o...
» mikenov on Twitter: Detection of these sequences suggests that greater genetic diversity may exist among asfarviruses than previously thought and raises the possibility that human infection by asfarviruses may occur. jvi.asm.org/content/83/24/
16/05/20 10:50 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Detection of these sequences suggests that greater genetic diversity may exist among asfarviruses than previously thought and raises the possibility that human infection by asfarviruses may occur. jvi.asm.org/content/83/24/ Posted by mi...
» mikenov on Twitter: Detection of Novel Sequences Related to African Swine Fever Virus in Human Serum and Sewage | Journal of Virology jvi.asm.org/content/83/24/
16/05/20 10:50 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Detection of Novel Sequences Related to African Swine Fever Virus in Human Serum and Sewage | Journal of Virology jvi.asm.org/content/83/24/ Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:50pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: a single person (a lone wolf) without any special training in microbiology or financial support could release and disseminate ASF virus to a disease free territory. researchgate.net/publication/33
16/05/20 10:49 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) a single person (a lone wolf) without any special training in microbiology or financial support could release and disseminate ASF virus to a disease free territory. researchgate.net/publication/33 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16...
» mikenov on Twitter: (PDF) African Swine Fever -potential biological warfare threat researchgate.net/publication/33
16/05/20 10:45 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) (PDF) African Swine Fever -potential biological warfare threat researchgate.net/publication/33 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:45pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: On average 8,000 pork derived products are annually confiscated by Customs and Border Protection at the United States... These swine products with unknown sanitary status could pose a risk for foreign animal diseases introduction into
16/05/20 10:41 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) On average 8,000 pork derived products are annually confiscated by Customs and Border Protection at the United States... These swine products with unknown sanitary status could pose a risk for foreign animal diseases introduction into th...
» mikenov on Twitter: Could African swine fever and classical swine fever viruses enter into the United States via swine products carried in air passengers' luggage? - PubMed - NCBI ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30126055
16/05/20 10:39 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Could African swine fever and classical swine fever viruses enter into the United States via swine products carried in air passengers' luggage? - PubMed - NCBI ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30126055 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 202...
» mikenov on Twitter: Classical swine fever and African swine fever as bioweapons - Google Search google.com/search?newwind
16/05/20 10:38 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Classical swine fever and African swine fever as bioweapons - Google Search google.com/search?newwind Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:38pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine fever... academic.oup.com/bioscience/art
16/05/20 10:36 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine fever... academic.oup.com/bioscience/art Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:36pm mi...
» How African Swine Fever can affect humans
16/05/20 10:15 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . The spectre of African Swine Fever (ASF) rose its head in Sarawak recently when one out of 17 samples of canned pork luncheon meat imported from China was found to contain the ASF DNA . While the stat...
» mikenov on Twitter: How African Swine Fever can affect humans thestar.com.my/lifestyle/heal
16/05/20 10:15 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) How African Swine Fever can affect humans thestar.com.my/lifestyle/heal Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:15pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #Covid19 and African swine fever: What is the possible association? | #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/covid-
16/05/20 10:12 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #Covid19 and African swine fever: What is the possible association? | #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/covid- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:12pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #Covid19Review: Covid-19 and African swine fever: What is the poss... covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/covid-
16/05/20 10:11 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #Covid19Review: Covid-19 and African swine fever: What is the poss... covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/covid- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 2:11pm mikenov on Twitter
» Covid-19 and African swine fever: What is the possible association? | Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism
16/05/20 10:06 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Covid-19-Review. Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism - GS <a href="https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/biological-warfare-and-bioterrorism-gs.html" rel="nofollow">https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/biological-warfare-and-bioterrorism-gs.html</a> __________________________________________________...
» mikenov on Twitter: African swine fever virus - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_s
16/05/20 09:48 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) African swine fever virus - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_s Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:48pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: african swine fever in humans - Google Search google.com/search?q=afric
16/05/20 09:47 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) african swine fever in humans - Google Search google.com/search?q=afric Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:47pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Classical swine fever - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical
16/05/20 09:47 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Classical swine fever - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:47pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/9eCGiYSsKWaRU6
16/05/20 09:37 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/9eCGiYSsKWaRU6 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:37pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/aCppnjzsFdqU8W
16/05/20 09:37 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/aCppnjzsFdqU8W Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:37pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/Xq7QCFBVJtwPnX
16/05/20 09:37 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/Xq7QCFBVJtwPnX Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:37pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/GizrLQ8aDBbnZP
16/05/20 09:36 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/GizrLQ8aDBbnZP Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:36pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/DozGcpTRQtCwdP
16/05/20 09:36 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) #BiologicalWarfare and #Bioterrorism - images.app.goo.gl/DozGcpTRQtCwdP Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 1:36pm mikenov on Twitter
» Bioweapons, Biodiversity, and Ecocide: Potential Effects of Biological Weapons on Biological Diversity | BioScience
16/05/20 09:28 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . Many analysts rank cultured and genetically engineered biological organisms as the most dangerous of all existing weapons technologies, with the potential for producing more extensive and devastating ...
» mikenov on Twitter: It is important to emphasize that bioterrorist attacks against livestock or crops do not require access to weaponized diseases or laboratory cultures of disease organisms, nor do they involve organisms that may cause disease in humans.
16/05/20 09:18 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) It is important to emphasize that bioterrorist attacks against livestock or crops do not require access to weaponized diseases or laboratory cultures of disease organisms, nor do they involve organisms that may cause disease in humans. a...
» mikenov on Twitter: Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine fever academic.oup.com/bioscience/art
16/05/20 09:03 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine fever academic.oup.com/bioscience/art Poste...
» mikenov on Twitter: Bioweapons, Biodiversity, and Ecocide: Potential Effects of Biological Weapons on Biological Diversity | BioScience | Oxford Academic academic.oup.com/bioscience/art
16/05/20 08:57 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Bioweapons, Biodiversity, and Ecocide: Potential Effects of Biological Weapons on Biological Diversity | BioScience | Oxford Academic academic.oup.com/bioscience/art Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 12:57pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Germany and Poland discuss new action to stop spread of African swine fever thepigsite.com/news/2020/01/g via @thepigsite
16/05/20 07:10 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Germany and Poland discuss new action to stop spread of African swine fever thepigsite.com/news/2020/01/g via @thepigsite Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:10am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/H9SbktcceKCDbJ
16/05/20 07:09 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/H9SbktcceKCDbJ Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:09am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/f26rrYGHM446hx
16/05/20 07:09 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/f26rrYGHM446hx Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:09am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/FE8ZgD1Pik3wZ6
16/05/20 07:08 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/FE8ZgD1Pik3wZ6 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:08am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/TDUER8UYXhnYJ7
16/05/20 07:08 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/TDUER8UYXhnYJ7 Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:08am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/pAjk83EkH4YGqF
16/05/20 07:07 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Infected pork in Germany images.app.goo.gl/pAjk83EkH4YGqF Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 11:07am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Germany, one of Europe's major pork exporters. ... Wild boars are spreading ASF and there are fears infected animals could bring the disease into Germany, threatening Germany's huge pork exports to China.infected pork in germany - Goo
16/05/20 07:05 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Germany, one of Europe's major pork exporters. ... Wild boars are spreading ASF and there are fears infected animals could bring the disease into Germany, threatening Germany's huge pork exports to China. infected pork in germany - Googl...
» mikenov on Twitter: Can COVID-19 be spread through poop? Rice University researcher says it's not a silly question khou.com/article/news/h via @KHOU
16/05/20 06:18 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Can COVID-19 be spread through poop? Rice University researcher says it's not a silly question khou.com/article/news/h via @KHOU Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 10:18am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Five sailors on USS Roosevelt test positive for coronavirus for a second time nypost.com/2020/05/15/5-s via @nypost
16/05/20 06:02 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Five sailors on USS Roosevelt test positive for coronavirus for a second time nypost.com/2020/05/15/5-s via @nypost Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 10:02am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Burr submits final Russia report before leaving chairmanship wach.com/news/nation-wo
16/05/20 06:00 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Burr submits final Russia report before leaving chairmanship wach.com/news/nation-wo Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 10:00am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Calling on Americans to Vote Trump Out, The Lancet Eviscerates US President Over 'Incoherent' Covid-19 Response - go.shr.lc/3cEBAGk via @commondreams
16/05/20 05:56 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Calling on Americans to Vote Trump Out, The Lancet Eviscerates US President Over 'Incoherent' Covid-19 Response - go.shr.lc/3cEBAGk via @commondreams Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:56am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Islamic State looks to ride coronavirus to rebound | Tom Roeder gazette.com/military/islam via @csgazette
16/05/20 05:50 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Islamic State looks to ride coronavirus to rebound | Tom Roeder gazette.com/military/islam via @csgazette Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:50am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Yes, we need a global coronavirus inquiry, but not for petty political point-scoring theconversation.com/yes-we-need-a- via @ConversationEDU
16/05/20 05:43 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Yes, we need a global coronavirus inquiry, but not for petty political point-scoring theconversation.com/yes-we-need-a- via @ConversationEDU Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:43am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Trump Promises 'Warp Speed' Coronavirus Vaccine Effort With New Program tinyurl.com/ycumg6fr
16/05/20 05:33 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Trump Promises 'Warp Speed' Coronavirus Vaccine Effort With New Program tinyurl.com/ycumg6fr Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:33am mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Where did Covid-19 come from? What we know about its origins theguardian.com/world/2020/may
16/05/20 05:19 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Where did Covid-19 come from? What we know about its origins theguardian.com/world/2020/may Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:19am mikenov on Twitter
» Covid-19 may be man-made, claims Taiwan scholar
16/05/20 05:10 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Asia Times. As scientists, doctors, academics and conspiracy theorists toss around ideas and speculate on where the highly infectious virus originated, a professor in etiology at the National Taiwa...
» mikenov on Twitter: Determining the source of the virus would have important implications for epidemiology, he added, saying that if the virus was indeed synthetic, then it could be easier for it to be eradicated. asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid-
16/05/20 05:09 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Determining the source of the virus would have important implications for epidemiology, he added, saying that if the virus was indeed synthetic, then it could be easier for it to be eradicated. asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid- Posted by mik...
» mikenov on Twitter: French researchers had discovered four more amino acids in the gene sequence of Covid-19 than other known coronaviruses, which could be added artificially to make the viral transmission easier. asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid-
16/05/20 05:08 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) French researchers had discovered four more amino acids in the gene sequence of Covid-19 than other known coronaviruses, which could be added artificially to make the viral transmission easier. asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid- Posted by mik...
» mikenov on Twitter: analyses of the Covid-19 virus have shown that it had a 96% genetic similarity with an RaTG13 bat virus also stored at the institute, and that the Covid-19 could be manufactured by modifying the RaTG13 virus. asiatimes.com/2020/02/co
16/05/20 05:07 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) analyses of the Covid-19 virus have shown that it had a 96% genetic similarity with an RaTG13 bat virus also stored at the institute, and that the Covid-19 could be manufactured by modifying the RaTG13 virus. asiatimes.com/2020/02/covi...
» mikenov on Twitter: Covid-19 may be man-made, claims Taiwan scholar - Asia Times asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid-
16/05/20 05:04 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Covid-19 may be man-made, claims Taiwan scholar - Asia Times asiatimes.com/2020/02/covid- Posted by mikenov on Saturday, May 16th, 2020 9:04am mikenov on Twitter
» Covid-19-Review: 4:55 AM 5/16/2020 » Why COVID-19 appears to be man-made
16/05/20 05:02 from Blogs from Michael_Novakhov (19 sites) <a href="https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/455-am-5162020-why-covid-19-appears-to.html" rel="nofollow">https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/455-am-5162020-why-covid-19-appears-to.html</a> ___________________________________________________________________ » Why COVID-19 appears to be man-made. China says it came from bats like ...
» mikenov on Twitter: 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » #SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say 15/05/20 13:48 from Google Alert - sars cov 2 - The Origins Of Covid -19, Sars-Cov-2, and Coronavirus covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c
15/05/20 18:30 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » #SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say 15/05/20 13:48 from Google Alert - sars cov 2 - The Origins Of Covid -19, Sars-Cov-2, and Coronavirus covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c Pos...
» Saved Stories - TWEETS BY MIKENOV: COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt-
15/05/20 18:30 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt- Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 9:16pm Saved Stories - TWEETS BY MIKENOV
» Saved Stories - Blogs: COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt-
15/05/20 18:30 from Blogs from Michael_Novakhov (19 sites) COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt- Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 9:16pm Saved Stories - Blogs
» mikenov on Twitter: Covid-19-Review: 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't ... covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c
15/05/20 18:29 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Covid-19-Review: 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't ... covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 10:29pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt-
15/05/20 17:16 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) COVID-19 Isnt the Only Sickness Spreading Through Meat Plants sentientmedia.org/covid-19-isnt- Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 9:16pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: When Did Coronavirus Arrive in the U.S.? Heres a Review of the Evidence. nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/
15/05/20 17:13 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) When Did Coronavirus Arrive in the U.S.? Heres a Review of the Evidence. nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/ Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 9:13pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Is COVID-19 Man-Made or Natural? labmate-online.com/news/laborator
15/05/20 17:01 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Is COVID-19 Man-Made or Natural? labmate-online.com/news/laborator Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 9:01pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: Oxford coronavirus vaccine significantly reduces viral load in monkeys @sciencefocus sciencefocus.com/news/oxford-co
15/05/20 16:58 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Oxford coronavirus vaccine significantly reduces viral load in monkeys @sciencefocus sciencefocus.com/news/oxford-co Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 8:58pm mikenov on Twitter
» Explained: Scientific indications that show COVID-19 is man-made, Opinions & Blogs News
15/05/20 15:46 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Western scientists sympathetic to China and the obsequious media have expended enormous efforts to convince the public that the COVID-19 pandemic is a naturally...
» mikenov on Twitter: Explained: Scientific indications that show COVID-19 is man-made wionews.com/opinions-blogs @wionews
15/05/20 15:10 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) Explained: Scientific indications that show COVID-19 is man-made wionews.com/opinions-blogs @wionews Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 7:10pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: 10 cases, 2 weeks, 1 Supreme Court holding audio arguments kutv.com/news/nation-wo
15/05/20 15:05 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) 10 cases, 2 weeks, 1 Supreme Court holding audio arguments kutv.com/news/nation-wo Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 7:05pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: What the SARS-CoV-2 Genome Reveals via @MHealthLab labblog.uofmhealth.org/lab-report/wha
15/05/20 15:01 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) What the SARS-CoV-2 Genome Reveals via @MHealthLab labblog.uofmhealth.org/lab-report/wha Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 7:01pm mikenov on Twitter
» EU's Foreign Affairs Chief calls for independent inquiry into coronavirus origin
15/05/20 14:50 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story . Among other nations, the European Union has urged for an independent scientific inquiry into the origin of the coronavirus outbreak on May 14. High Representative of the EU for foreign affairs Josep B...
» mikenov on Twitter: EU CALLS FOR COVID-19 ORIGIN PROBE #REPUBLIC @republic republicworld.com/world-news/res
15/05/20 14:49 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) EU CALLS FOR COVID-19 ORIGIN PROBE #REPUBLIC @republic republicworld.com/world-news/res Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 6:49pm mikenov on Twitter
» SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didnt Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say | Medicine
15/05/20 14:42 from Mike Nova's Shared Newslinks Michael_Novakhov shared this story from Breaking Science News | <a href="http://Sci-News.com" rel="nofollow">Sci-News.com</a>. A team of researchers from China and the United States has sequenced the genome of pangolin-CoV-2020, a coronavirus isolated from sick Malayan pangolins ( Mani...
» mikenov on Twitter: SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didnt Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say | Medicine | Sci-News.com sci-news.com/medicine/sars-
15/05/20 14:42 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didnt Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say | Medicine | <a href="http://Sci-News.com" rel="nofollow">Sci-News.com</a> sci-news.com/medicine/sars- Posted by mikenov on Friday, May 15th, 2020 6:42pm mikenov on Twitter
» mikenov on Twitter: 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say 15/05/20 13:48 from Google Alert - sars cov 2 - The Origins Of Covid -19, Sars-Cov-2, and Coronavirus covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c
15/05/20 14:37 from TWEETS BY MIKENOV from mikenova (1 sites) 2:35 PM 5/15/2020 » SARS-CoV-2 Coronavirus Didn't Come from Pangolins, Scientists Say 15/05/20 13:48 from Google Alert - sars cov 2 - The Origins Of Covid -19, Sars-Cov-2, and Coronavirus covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/sars-c Post... | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Pig coronavirus potentially harmful to humans | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Scientists are concerned that a recently discovered coronavirus could emerge to cause outbreaks in humans.
The virus, porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV), was first identified in in 2012 in Chinese pigs and later caused an outbreak of diarrhea in pigs in Ohio, according to a news release. The disease is potentially fatal. Writing in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, researchers from The Ohio State University and Utrecht University in the Netherlands reported that PDCoV is capable of infecting human, cat and chicken cells in a lab. By showing for the first time that the virus could bind to the receptor in human cells, the researchers said they demonstrated its ability for cross-species transmission. From that point, its just a matter of whether it can replicate within the cells and cause disease in those animals and humans, Scott Kenney, PhD, assistant professor and researcher in The Ohio State University College of Veterinary Medicine, said in the release.
Source: Adobe Stock
Coronaviruses are a frequent cause of mild or moderate upper respiratory tract illnesses in humans and occasionally cause more serious lower respiratory tract infections like pneumonia or bronchitis, according to the CDC. Two coronaviruses SARS and MERS have emerged from animal hosts this century to cause deadly outbreaks in humans.PDCoV is a Deltacoronavirus one of the four main subgroups of coronaviruses and is most closely related to a sparrow coronavirus. Kenney and colleagues said all previously identified members of the Deltacoronavirus genus have been detected in birds, suggesting that birds are viruses natural host. Were very concerned about emerging coronaviruses and worry about the harm they can do to animals and their potential to jump to humans, co-author Linda Saif, PhD, distinguished university professor of preventive medicine in The Ohio State University College of Veterinary Medicine, said in the release. Saif said a coming study will look for antibodies in the blood to determine if PDCoV has already infected people. We now know for sure that porcine deltacoronavirus can bind to and enter cells of humans and birds, she said. Our next step is to look at susceptibility can sick pigs transmit their virus to chickens, or vice versa, and to humans? by Gerard Gallagher Disclosures: The authors report no relevant financial disclosures. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Porcine Respiratory Coronavirus as a SARS Model | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly emerging global disease of humans with a major economic impact and significant bioterrorism potential caused by a new strain of coronavirus (CoV). The lung is the target organ related to the disease manifestations, although diarrhea occurs in some patients. Unresolved questions related to SARS pathogenesis include the mechanisms for """"""""superspreaders"""""""" and the atypical pneumonia and variable diarrhea induced and the role of polymicrobial infections in the variable severity of SARS. Host immune factors, especially proinflammatory cytokines may play a role in the severe pulmonary damage, as observed in our studies of respiratory disease in pigs. The widespread use of steroids and IFNs for treatment of SARS patients without a clear understanding of their impact on respiratory disease, necessitates studies of their impact in an animal model susceptible to respiratory CoV infection. Although primates are susceptible to SARS CoV, their limited availability and expense hampers comprehensive studies of SARS pathogenesis. In mouse models, the clinicopathological manifestations of CoV or influenza viral infections differ from in humans whereas in pigs they mimic the human disease. The anatomy, physiology and immune system of the pig respiratory tract closely resembles that of man, providing a unique animal model for the study of viral respiratory disease of humans. The porcine respiratory CoV (PRCV), a spike deletion mutant of the enteric CoV transmissible gastroenteritis virus (TGEV), shows striking pathogenetic similarities to SARS CoV in its primary replication in lung. Of interest, PRCV invariably induces similar lung lesions with atypical pneumonia, even in asymptomatic pigs. Our studies suggest that polymicrobial co-infections influence the severity of PRCV infection, lesions and disease via multiple mechanisms. These include the repertoire of proinflammatory cytokines or the cell infiltrates induced in lung, and the multiple cell types infected. Therefore our aim is to determine the influence of steroids and coinfections with respiratory viruses or bacterial derived components (and the cytokines induced) on the severity of a SARS-like respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) infection of swine.
Our Specific Aims are: 1) To assess if corticosteroid treatment of PRCV-infected pigs has an impact on cytokines induced by PRCV or acquired immunity to PRCV and the subsequent course of PRCV infection and disease (mimic impact of steroids on SARS patients); 2) To investigate the impact of prior infection with a distantly related (Nidovirales) low pathogenic respiratory viral pathogen (arterivirus, PRRSV) on subsequent PRCV infection and disease (mimic dual SARS CoV and distinct respiratory CoV infections); 3) To explore the impact of initial infection with PRCV followed by subsequent infection with the respiratory viral pathogen swine influenza virus on PRCV infection and disease (mimic dual infections with SARS CoV and influenza); 4) To determine the impact of concurrent infection of pigs with two antigenically related coronaviruses with distinct tissue tropisms (PRCV, respiratory and TGEV, enteric) on generation of PRCV/TGEV recombinants and coronavirus infection and disease (mimic SARS superspeaders with diarrhea); 5) To examine the impact of sequential inoculation of pigs with PRCV followed by bacterial cell wall components on cytokine production and disease (mimic impact of bacterial coinfections on bacterial coinfections on SARS). | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
How African Swine Fever can affect humans | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The spectre of African Swine Fever (ASF) rose its head in Sarawak recently when one out of 17 samples of canned pork luncheon meat imported from China was found to contain the ASF DNA.
While the states pigs are currently still clear of ASF infection, outbreaks of this zoonotic disease have occurred in neighbouring countries Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines, as well as China and other Asian and Eastern Europe countries. The situation in China is particularly serious with millions of pigs having died or culled this year. ASF is caused by a DNA virus and is a very contagious haemorrhagic disease that affects pigs exclusively. It causes malaise, fever, vomiting, bloody diarrhoea, disseminated intravascular coagulation (where blood clots develop abnormally in the bloodstream) and death in both wild and domestic pigs. Domestic pigs are more vulnerable to the disease, with their death rate being nearly 100% in most outbreaks. The virus passes between pigs via direct contact, contact with contaminated feed or contact with vectors like ticks. The ASF is a hardy virus that remains stable and infectious for three to six months in uncooked pork products. It is not known to infect humans or other animals. ASF was first reported in Kenya and has remained in Africa for much of its history. However, ASF surfaced in Georgia in 2007 and has spread from the Caucasus to Eastern Europe, affecting both the domestic pig and wild boar populations. Pork is the second most commonly consumed meat in the world, comprising more than a third of global consumption. With increasing meat demand, the demand for pigs has also increased as they are able to convert low quality feed to protein efficiently. About half of the over one billion pigs in the world are found in China, where they are used mostly for domestic consumption. Countries with a local outbreak of ASF usually use culling of the affected or potentially affected animals, along with sanitary disposal of the carcasses, as the main method of controlling the outbreak. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) stated that ASF is endemic (entrenched) in the Xinjiang and Tibet regions, making its eradication more difficult. The FAO also estimated that about one-fifth of Chinas pig population may have been culled in the first few months of 2019. There is currently no vaccine for the prevention of ASF, neither is there treatment for infected animals. The ASF outbreaks do not just affect the pig industry, but also have effects on human health and healthcare. Some of the pork luncheon meat products seized after Sarawak declared a ban on such products imported from China recently. Filepic ASF and heparin Heparin, a blood-thinning drug (anticoagulant), is prescribed to people at risk of developing blood clots, which can block blood flow or travel to the lungs or brain. Blood clots that travel to the lungs or brain can cause a pulmonary embolism or stroke respectively, which can be life-threatening. Heparin is used in the treatment of venous thromboembolism; prophylaxis in medical and surgical practice, e.g. for the prevention of heart attacks and stroke; and in various medical interventions, e.g. blood transfusion, maintenance of patency in central vascular devices, haemodialysis, angiography and percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI or angioplasty). Heparin may be prescribed for the short or long term depending on the patients clinical condition. The action of anticoagulants may need to be reversed when there is active bleeding during their use or when the indication for anticoagulation is no longer present. One of the advantages of the common form of heparin is that its effects can be neutralised or reversed rapidly by specific drugs. In contrast, there is no antidote for the synthetic heparin available in Malaysia. The active ingredient in commercially-available heparin in many countries is from pig intestines. Cows were previously a source of heparin, but the use of such products were discontinued in the 1990s, due to concerns about the prions that cause mad-cow disease. Another potential source of heparin is from sheep or goats, but these products have not been tested in humans. China, which is the worlds largest pig producer, accounts for about 60-80% of the global supply of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) needed in the manufacture of heparin. While culling is effective in containing the spread of ASF, the measure has serious implications for the manufacturing of heparin, leading to a potential global shortage of this drug. Fresenius Kabi, a major global heparin manufacturer, stated ... we do not rely solely on China for API. We source from multiple suppliers and geographies to serve our customers, but the situation in China is expected to cause API supply constraints globally for an unknown period. As mentioned above, the market is also experiencing finished pro-duct supply interruptions from other manufacturers. This has significantly increased demand for Fresenius Kabi heparin. As a leader in injectable medications and a leading supplier of heparin, Fresenius Kabi has put plans in place to monitor the market and to help mitigate a potential future heparin shortage. A thallasaemia patient receives his blood transfusion in this filepic. Blood transfusions are among the medical procedures that require the use of heparin, the supply of which is being threatened by the massive culling of pigs due to ASF. No viable alternatives The global pharmaceutical supply chain requires a stable supply of raw ingredients for manufacturing and finishing facilities in many countries. This complex and integrated system is very dependent on ingredients and products from far-off countries, and is highly vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of raw ingredients. Supply disruptions due to a loss of production capacity can be mitigated by increasing production at other facilities or sourcing new suppliers. However, for heparin, the issue is not production capacity, but the supply of API. There is currently no apparent viable replacement for the API from China. Considerable time and effort would be needed for clinical trials for new heparin products and/or to develop safe and effective protocols that address safety concerns about bovine-based heparin. Although there are ongoing efforts to produce synthetic heparin API, more work is required. The alternative anticoagulant drugs currently available may not be suitable replacements in all patients and clinical situations. Some experts believe it may take years to control the ASF outbreaks. Even if the outbreaks were brought under control soon, it would take time for the pig industry in China to recover. This could mean a prolonged shortage of heparin that would impact on its usage. The current ASF outbreaks pose no direct threat to human health. However, the threat to humans stems from the impact of the control measures, i.e. the unprecedented culling. With Chinas efforts to control ASF, the production capacity for heparin will be limited to some extent for an unknown period. Addressing ASFs impact on human health and healthcare goes beyond the checking of imported food products or pigs for ASF. Although regulators in many countries are monitoring the heparin supplies, there is no information as to whether the Health Ministry is doing likewise. Furthermore, public disclosure by the ministry of its policies and protocols to mitigate the potential effect of ASF on human healthcare would go a long way in providing direction for hospitals and medical practitioners, as the availability of heparin would certainly impact on the safety and quality of care. The reader is advised to discuss with their attending doctor on the types, risks, benefits, effectiveness and side effects of heparin, which should include reversal or neutralisation if active bleeding ensues after injection. In addition, the availability and feasibility, e.g. costs, are other important factors to consider. The stopping of heparin therapy should only be on medical advice. Dr Milton Lum is a past president of the Federation of Private Medical Practitioners Associations and the Malaysian Medical Association. The views expressed do not represent that of organisations that the writer is associated with. The information provided is for educational and communication purposes only and it should not be construed as personal medical advice. Information published in this article is not intended to replace, supplant or augment a consultation with a health professional regarding the readers own medical care. The Star disclaims all responsibility for any losses, damage to property or personal injury suffered directly or indirectly from reliance on such information. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Covid-19 and African swine fever: What is the possible association? | Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism - GS https://covid-19-review.blogspot.com/2020/05/biological-warfare-and-bioterrorism-gs.html __________________________________________________________________ It is important to emphasize that bioterrorist attacks against livestock or crops do not require access to weaponized diseases or laboratory cultures of disease organisms, nor do they involve organisms that may cause disease in humans. Samples of infectious materials obtained or cultured from infected plants or animals (or by-products thereof) are all that would be required in many instances (Brown 1999). Natural, highly virulent diseases of livestock that are easily acquired and transported... __________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ Michael Novakhov - Posts on Twitter - 250 | Page _____________________________________ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Bioweapons, Biodiversity, and Ecocide: Potential Effects of Biological Weapons on Biological Diversity | BioScience | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Many analysts rank cultured and genetically engineered biological organisms as the most dangerous of all existing weapons technologies, with the potential for producing more extensive and devastating effects on human populations than even fusion nuclear weapons (Henderson 1999). Biological weapons (bioweapons) are defined as biological organisms, and substances derived directly from living organisms, that can be used to cause death or injury to humans, animals, or plants. Diseases and biological toxins have been used as weapons of war throughout recorded history, from at least as early as Biblical times to the present day. Historically, bioweapons were used primarily, although not exclusively, for direct attacks against human populations. Biowarfare has historically involved the use of plant and fungal toxins (hellebore, ergot), animal carcasses, human cadavers, disease-contaminated clothing or blankets, and fecal matter (Christopher et al. 1997, Kortepeter et al. 2001). The potential spectrum of bioterrorism ranges from isolated acts against individuals by individuals (rogue scientist or Una bomber-type scenarios) to tactical and strategic military uses and state-sponsored international terrorism intended to cause mass casualties within or among humans or animals or both (Tucker 2000, Zilinskas 2000).
Perhaps the oldest traditional application of bioweapon techniques has been the contamination or poisoning of drinking water sources using animal carcasses, human cadavers, feces, or poisonous plants and their derivatives. During the 14th century, Mongol armies catapulted the infected corpses of plague victims over the walls into the besieged city of Caffa, in what is now the Crimea, to try to force the surrender of the city's inhabitants. During the 18th century, the British colonial army used smallpox-contaminated blankets to spread disease among Native American tribes in northeastern North America and smallpox-infected civilian infiltrators to spread disease among insurgent American militias during the American Revolutionary War (Wheelis 1999). Government-sponsored scientific research into the development of technologically sophisticated applications of biological weapons for use against humans, livestock, and crops began during the early decades of the 20th century. Most government bioweapons programs included research on the culture and testing of disease agents intended specifically for use against livestock and food crops (Ban 2000). During World War I, Germany investigated techniques for using anthrax, glanders, cholera, and fungal diseases of wheat as biological weapons. German espionage agents attempted to create outbreaks of anthrax among livestock in Romania and Argentina and spread glanders among horses and mulesthen still critically important as cavalry mounts and draft animals for the transport of artillery, ordnance, and suppliesin Mesopotamia, France, Argentina, and the United States. Germany was also implicated in an attempt to precipitate an epidemic of plague among humans in St. Petersburg, Russia (Dire and McGovern 2002). Japan developed and used biological weapons against human and animal populations in Asia during the period 19321945 (Kortepeter et al. 2001). Plague-infected fleas were reportedly used by the Japanese to precipitate plague epidemics in China during World War II, and it has been estimated that some 10,000 human subjects were used for bioweapon experiments in China involving anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox (Christopher et al. 1997). During the 1980s and 1990s, Soviet scientists used newly developed genetic engineering techniques to create antibiotic-resistant and vaccine-subverting strains of smallpox, anthrax, plague, and tularemia for bioweapon applications (Alibek and Handelman 2000). Genetically modified zoonotic and epizootic diseases of humans and animals (plague, tularemia, anthrax) and virulent cultivated or wild strains of natural livestock diseases (e.g., foot and mouth disease [FMD], rinderpest, brucellosis) represent potentially serious threats to livestock, wildlife, and endangered species populations. Plant diseases developed for bioweapons applications against food crops, opium poppies, and coca plants may, however, infect nontarget species of wild plants and become established locally subsequent to their introduction to new environments (Madden and van den Bosch 2002). Bioterrorist uses of enzootic livestock diseases and emerging zoonotic diseases (diseases that can be transmitted between animal and human populations) represent a potentially serious threat to livestock and wildlife populations never previously exposed to these diseases. This risk holds true even, and perhaps especially in some instances, for wildlife species that may become infected by serious livestock diseases without exhibiting overt clinical signs of infection. Many formerly ubiquitous diseases that have been eradicated from livestock populations in the United States and Western Europe over the past century are still common elsewhere and readily accessible to individuals and terrorist organizations. Vaccines for many animal diseases still common in developing countries have been phased out in Europe and North America, and these vaccines, along with drugs for routine treatment, may not be readily available in sufficient quantities to suppress large-scale disease outbreaks among animals and livestock. Many of the bioweapons agents cultured and tested for use against animals and humans during the early decades of the 20th century were not highly contagious organisms. Current biological weapons arsenals, however, include diseases that are highly infectious and contagious, easy to produce and deploy, and able to cause high morbidity or mortality in human and animal populations. Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever (hog cholera), avian influenza, African swine fever, Rift Valley fever, African horse sickness, rinderpest, and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (OTA 1993, CNS 2002, Kortepeter et al. 2001). Prior assumptions that bioweaponeers and bioterrorists might not be willing to endanger their own lives in developing and deploying highly contagious human diseases need to be reevaluated in the light of the many recent suicide attacks in the United States and Israel. It is important to emphasize that bioterrorist attacks against livestock or crops do not require access to weaponized diseases or laboratory cultures of disease organisms, nor do they involve organisms that may cause disease in humans. Samples of infectious materials obtained or cultured from infected plants or animals (or by-products thereof) are all that would be required in many instances (Brown 1999). Natural, highly virulent diseases of livestock that are easily acquired and transported, not dangerous to humans, and capable of causing catastrophic epidemics in countries with industrialized livestock production methods are common and widely distributed within many countries around the world. Virulent contagious diseases of livestock such as anthrax, rinderpest, and FMD are still enzootic and sometimes even common within a number of countries associated with highly organized, well-financed, and globally active terrorist organizations (Roeder 1999, Tucker 2000). No elaborate delivery technologies or methods are necessary for clandestine, economically targeted bioweapons attacks on agricultural crops or livestock. All that is required is a willing actor or conspirator, a little careful planning, and access to an appropriate disease agent (OTA 1993). The use of bioweapons for the purpose of economic sabotage against national agricultural and livestock industries is a potentially serious threat to biodiversity. Not only do bioweapons have direct effects on the genetic diversity of domesticated plants and animals, there is also the potential for both direct and indirect consequences on plant and animal populations. In this article, we focus on the potential effects of the use of laboratory-cultured bioweapons as well as natural (wild-type) disease organisms as biological weapons within and among animal populations. Much of what we discuss also applies to the potential effects of plant bioweapons on nontarget species of wild and domesticated plants. Biological warfare and bioterrorismZoonotic and epizootic disease organisms known to have been cultivated and tested in bioweapon research programs include Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Brucella abortus (brucellosis), Clostridium botulinum, Apthovirus (FMD), Burkholderia mallei (glanders), morbilliviruses (measles, canine distemper, rinderpest), Staphylococcus, Francisella tularensis (tularemia), rabies virus, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, and several virulent hemorrhagic fever viruses (Ebola, Marburg, Lassa fever, Rift Valley fever) (OTA 1993, Kortepeter et al. 2001, CNS 2002). Plant bioweapons cultured and tested for disrupting agriculture and food production have included fungal diseases (Fusarium spp., Tilletia spp.), viral diseases, and even insect pests (e.g., Colorado potato beetle, Leptinotarsa decemlineata).The former USSR sponsored extensive research on possible bioweapons applications of a variety of fungal diseases of important food crops (wheat stem rust, rice blast), viral and bacterial diseases of domesticated livestock (e.g., anthrax, tularemia, malignant catarrhal fever), and insect disease vectors (mosquitoes, ticks, fleas) (Bozheyeva et al. 1999). The Soviet bioweapons program tested plant and livestock bioweapon diseases for potential deployment, with the goal of disrupting food production and food processing infrastructures and damaging the agricultural sector of national economies (Alibek and Handelman 2000). Soviet scientists reportedly used newly developed genetic engineering techniques to create vaccine-subverting and antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox for attacks against military forces and civilian populations (Bozheyeva et al. 1999, Alibek and Handelman 2000). Most, perhaps even all, of the cultivated and potentially weaponized diseases identified by the Office International des Epizooties as possible major threats to livestock and wildlife species (FMD, rinderpest, Newcastle disease, African swine fever, sheep pox, and Rift Valley fever; OIE 2001) were experimentally tested for bioweapons applications under the Soviet bioweapons research and development program (Bozheyeva et al. 1999, Kortepeter et al. 2001) Countries believed to have active biowarfare research programs during recent years include some former USSR states (i.e., Russia, Kazakstan), Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, China, South Africa, Libya, Cuba, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States (Leitenberg 2000). Several major international terrorist organizations, including but not restricted to the Al Qaeda network, are believed to have the financial resources and political contacts needed to access state-of-the-art bioweapon disease cultures and production technologies. Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese terrorist group that used sarin gas for a terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system, was also involved in developing terrorist bioweapons employing anthrax spores, botulism toxin, Q fever, and Ebola virus (Christopher et al. 1997). Recent advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering have opened the way for a potential Pandora's box scenario, in which the unforeseen proliferation of a bioweapon organism could severely affect human and animal populations at regional, continental, or even global levels. Recent gene-transfer experiments with viral interleukin4 and viral diseases of the house mouse (Mus musculus) have demonstrated that even carefully controlled and monitored genetic engineering experiments may produce entirely unanticipated results, generating viruses or organisms with unwanted, deleterious, and sometimes extremely dangerous properties (Jackson et al. 2001). Threats to biodiversity and endangered speciesThere is a growing but still insufficient scientific recognition of the importance of disease control for the conservation of biodiversity and endangered species populations (Daszak et al. 2000). Organisms that are relatively benign in their natural hosts can cause fatal diseases in other species. Cross-species infections with human herpes simplex Type 1 may be fatal for New World marmosets (Callithrix spp.), and an apparently benign herpes virus of African elephants (Loxodonta africana) causes a fatal systemic disease in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) (Richman et al. 1999). Saprolegnia ferox, a common oomycete disease of hatchery-reared fishes, has been implicated as a factor in disease-related population declines of amphibians in northwestern North America (Kiesecker et al. 2001). Avian malaria and avian pox have been implicated in the extinctions of native bird species in Hawaii, and MacPhee and Marx (1997) suggest that diseases introduced through humans and human commensals may have been a factor in prehistoric mass extinctions of wildlife species in Madagascar and North America.The use of biological weapons against livestock populations or agricultural crops could have potentially disastrous spillover effects on wild species of plants and animals (Brown 1999, Daszak et al. 2000). Many of the currently available bioweapon pathogens are broad-spectrum diseases that are capable of causing high levels of mortality or morbidity among wild and domesticated species of animals, as well as human beings (figure 1). Three of the four genetically modified pathogens created specifically for bioweapon attacks against human populations are zoonotic diseases whose release into the environment may pose both direct and indirect threats to wildlife populations (i.e., anthrax, plague, tularemia; Alibek and Handelman 2000). Virulent strains of natural disease pathogens known to have been cultured and tested for bioweapon attacks against domesticated livestock (e.g., rinderpest, FMD, brucellosis) could have potentially devastating effects on naive and susceptible populations of susceptible wild ungulates. The Great African Rinderpest epizootic of a century ago provides a useful model for predicting the potential effects of the proliferation of highly virulent and contagious bioweapon diseases on susceptible wildlife and livestock species. Rinderpest virus was introduced into Africa in 1887 through cattle imported to Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) from India to provision European colonial armies. The subsequent epidemic outbreak of rinderpest that began in 1889 swept from the Horn of Africa to the southern cape in less than a decade, exhibiting an effective average dispersal rate of approximately 3 km per day during an era predating automobiles and aircraft. The rinderpest panzootic proliferated rapidly among native African cattle breeds and susceptible wild ungulate species, killing an estimated 90% to 95% of the cattle, African buffalo (Syncerus caffer), and wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) in East Africa within 3 years of its first appearance in the region (Daszak et al. 2000). Cattle populations were devastated and African buffalo extirpated from most of their range in southern and eastern Africa. The African buffalo, formerly the most characteristic and abundant ungulate of the African plains, was reduced to a few small, scattered relict herds (Sinclair 1979). Despite intensive control efforts over the past century, rinderpest is still enzootic within East Africa, with periodic outbreaks occurring among livestock and wildlife populations in the region (Dobson 1994). The importance of buffalo as a food resource for African huntergatherer societies was surpassed, however, by the immense importance of domesticated cattle to pastoral and agricultural societies of eastern and southern Africa. Cattle have served for centuries, and in some instances perhaps millennia, as the principal source of food, wealth, and motive energy for the Nilotic and Bantu peoples of eastern and southern Africa. The rinderpest epidemic effectively dispossessed indigenous African peoples of food resources, traditional livelihoods, and wealth and property in ways that were potentially more disruptive to traditional cultural milieus than the physical displacement from traditional territories and the political and economic subjugation of African peoples by European colonial administrations. Milk and meat from cattle provide critically important sources of essential dietary protein in African pastoral and agrarian societies (Holtzman 2001), while the cattle themselves were (and still are throughout much of the continent) important for the cultivation and fertilization of food crops and as the principal real property assets of families living under communal or open land-tenure systems. The Nilotic pastoral peoples of eastern Africa who depended entirely or primarily on the blood and milk of cattle for nutrition and subsistence were devastated by the rinderpest epidemic of the 1890s; an estimated two-thirds of the Masai people of eastern Africa starved to death during a single two-year period following the destruction of their herds by rinderpest (Sinclair 1979). Traditional cattle-raising and farming societies, such as the Sukuma and Samburu peoples of eastern Africa and the Ndebele and Zulu peoples of southern Africa, were also severely affected by the rinderpest epidemic. The immediate social and economic effects of the 18891899 rinderpest epidemic on the Bantu and Nilotic peoples of eastern and southern Africa closely parallel the effects of the extirpation of the Plains bison (Bison bison) on Native American peoples in the Great Plains region of North America from 1870 to 1885. In evolutionary and ecological terms, however, the impacts of the great rinderpest epidemic on African ungulate faunas may have been surpassed by the effects of the chestnut blight fungus (Cryphonectria parasitica, formerly Endothia parasitica) on the temperate deciduous forest biome of eastern North America. The American chestnut (C. dentata), once the dominant and most abundant tree species of eastern North American forests, has been extirpated throughout its range by the chestnut blight. Before disappearance, the American chestnut was an important timber and fuelwood tree that provided an abundant and high-quality food resource for wildlife, livestock, and human populations throughout much of eastern North America. Chestnut blight was first recorded in New York City in 1904, presumably having been introduced along with Japanese chestnut trees (C. crenata) imported as nursery stock. The chestnut blight spread at a rate estimated at between 2050 miles per year, reducing the American chestnut to a state of virtual extinction throughout its range by 1950. Current efforts to save the American chestnut from extinction focus on biological control of the disease itself through a virulence-attenuating virus and hybridization and backcrossing with a blight-resistant related species, the Chinese chestnut (C. mollissima). The American elm (Ulmus americana) is another characteristic and formerly common tree of eastern North American landscapes that has also been driven to virtual extinction by an introduced fungal pathogen, the Dutch elm disease Ophiostoma (Ceratocystis) ulmi. A century later, New York City is the apparent entry site for an emerging and potentially fatal disease of humans and animals, the West Nile virus (WNV). The establishment and spread of WNV in North America after its appearance in 1999 is perhaps the best available modern example of the potential dispersal capabilities of bioweapon diseases within and among human and animal populations. The dispersion of WNV illustrates the immense (and in some cases possibly insurmountable) difficulties in identifying and controlling cryptic and potentially lethal zoonotic diseases. WNV is a mosquito-transmitted disease of birds and mammals, including humans, which causes high rates of mortality in some host species (Rappole et al. 2000). Although WNV is primarily a disease of birds, mammals are common secondary but dead-end hosts for this virus. WNV infections have been reported from numerous species of both wild and domesticated mammals (e.g., humans, horses, cats, bats, chipmunks, skunks, squirrels, domestic rabbits, and raccoons). West Nile virus has become firmly established in eastern North America during the past 3 years, and it appears probable that migrating birds may ultimately spread the disease throughout the Americas and the Caribbean. As of March 2002, WNV has been confirmed in 27 states in the eastern United States, as well as in Ontario (Canada) and the Cayman Islands (ERAP 2002). The history of bovine tuberculosis and rinderpest in Africa and brucellosis in North America shows that exotic diseases may be difficult or impossible to eradicate once they have been introduced and have become established in wild species within new localities. In the case of anthrax, the risk of subsequent disease outbreaks within contaminated areas may continue for decades and even centuries after the total eradication of hosts and vectors: Viable, infectious anthrax bacilli have been cultured from animal bones buried for 150 to 200 years in archeological sites (de Vos 1990, Dixon et al. 1999). Bioweapon diseases may spread faster and prove much more difficult to suppress and eradicate than the historical examples cited above might indicate, given the exceptional virulence and environmental resilience of cultured bioweapon disease strains (Alibek and Handelman 2000). Bioweapon threats to biodiversityEfforts to control human disease epidemics resulting from plague and tularemia bioweapon attacks will need to take into account the eradication of potential animal reservoirs and insect vectors once initial outbreaks among human populations have been contained (Alibek and Handelman 2000). As potential disease reservoirs, rare or endangered species populations within affected areas may be subject to eradication as well. Thus, endangered species now restricted to a few relict and isolated populations within highly urbanized landscapes (e.g., Stephen's Kangagroo Rat, Dipodomys stephensi) could be at high risk for extinction under such circumstances. It is worth noting in this context that an extraordinarily high number of endangered and threatened species (including D. stephensi) are now largely or entirely restricted to habitats located in and around US military installations and military training ranges, which could be potential targets of bioweapons attacks; more than 220 federally listed threatened or endangered species have been confirmed as residents or migrants on US military lands. Although military lands represent only about 3% of all US federal lands, they contain disproportionately high percentages of habitat for endangered species of plants and animals (Leslie et al. 1996).Wild plant and animal species that are naturally rare and species that have been severely depleted in numbers from overharvesting or habitat degradation are particularly susceptible to extinction by introduced diseases (Dobson and May 1986). Diseases to which humans and human commensals have developed immunity or high levels of resistance may cause catastrophic mortality in naive and susceptible wildlife populations. Small absolute population sizes, inbreeding depression, and exposure to exotic disease organisms are a potential recipe for the extinction of endangered and threatened wildlife species (Singer et al. 2001). There needs to be much wider recognition by scientists and the public of the danger that diseases of domesticated animals and humans pose for wildlife and endangered species populations, and of the pivotal role of human interventions in fostering the introduction and establishment of exotic diseases of plants and animals to new areas (Dudley 1993, Daszak et al. 2000). Bioweapon applications are only the most extreme example of the larger invasive species problems associated with the introductions of exotic diseases and organisms to new areas as the result of deliberate or inadvertent human activities. The potentially devastating harm of even localized disease outbreaks on endangered species is illustrated by the effects of canine distemper on the North American black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes), the Caspian seal (Phoca caspica), and the African wild dog (Lycaon pictus). Canine distemper is a common viral disease of domesticated dogs that can spill over into wildlife populations, with appalling results on susceptible species of wild carnivores. Disturbingly, canine distemper is also a disease that has been cultured and tested in bioweapon laboratories (Kortepeter et al. 2001). During the past decade, canine distemper outbreaks resulted in the extinction of the last known wild population of the North American black-footed ferret and the African wild dog population of the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania (Daszak et al. 2000). Habitat loss and persecution, exacerbated by the effects of canine distemper on ferrets and sylvatic plague on prey populations (prairie dogs), caused the decline and ultimate extinction of black-footed ferrets from their formerly vast range within the Great Plains region of North America. Similarly, persecution and predator-control operations have reduced the once widely distributed African wild dog to a few small and scattered populations that are now gravely threatened by spillover infections of canine distemper and rabies from domestic dog populations (Ginsberg et al. 1995). An outbreak of distemper in the Serengeti region of Tanzania during the early 1990s caused the extirpation of the resident wild dog population and the death of approximately one-third of the Serengeti's resident lion population. The small resident population of endangered cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus) could have been driven to the verge of extinction in the Serengeti had they experienced rates of distemper morbidity and mortality comparable to that observed among African wild dogs and lions at this site (Kelly 2001). Livestock breed conservation is important for the retention of the genetic raw material for morphological and physiological adaptations that may provide enhanced resistance to insects, parasites, and disease and to the effects of climate, altitude, solar radiation, and other key environmental factors. Worldwide, there are approximately 4000 recognized breeds and local breed varieties of the principal domesticated livestock species (ass, cattle, water buffalo, pig, horse, sheep, goats). This once great array of local and endemic livestock breeds has been drastically eroded over the past century (Ruane 2000). At least 700 of the surviving local and traditional breeds of these seven livestock species, including 350 breeds in Europe alone, are in imminent danger of disappearance because of the global emphasis on a few highly cosmopolitan commercial breeds. Most remaining local livestock breeds have critically small population sizes and highly localized distributions, restricted in some instances to only one or two farms located within a single village or township (Ruane 2000). Local breeds often consist of highly inbred lines that may be susceptible to extinction as the result of even an extremely localized disease outbreak (Ruane 2000, Toro et al. 2000). News reports in March 2001 indicated that at least one of England's relict endemic sheep breeds had been condemned to extinction through sanitary slaughter as a consequence of the recent FMD outbreak. In view of the potential effects of sanitary slaughter on the maintenance of genetic diversity within rare livestock breeds, the European Union and British government have now established policies for exempting rare breeds from prohibitions on disease vaccination and precautionary sanitary slaughter under certain circumstances (DEFRA 2002). Some diseases that cause high rates of morbidity and mortality in humans or domesticated animals may occur in wildlife species without manifesting clinical signs of disease infection (e.g., hantaviruses, Trypanosma spp.). Control measures for zoonotic diseases may result in concerted efforts to eradicate any and all wildlife species that may be potential reservoirs, intermediate hosts, or vectors for disease transmission to humans or domesticated animals. Containment of plague and tularemia disease outbreaks resulting from bioweapon attacks will necessitate the control or eradication of rodent populations within affected areas to prevent the subsequent transmission of the disease from infected rodents to humans (Alibek and Handelman 2000). Populations of many wildlife species are already routinely subject to stringent control or local extirpation in many areas to control the transmission of endemic diseases to domesticated animals, in some instances without any supporting evidence to validate the clinical efficacy of such efforts. In the United States, programs to control brucellosis in cattle populations have resulted in the culling or attempted eradication of populations of bison (Bison bison), elk (Cervus canadensis), and whitetail deer (Odocoileus virginiana). Other examples of such control programs include the routine culling of wild boar (Sus scrofa) populations in several European countries to control the transmission of classical swine fever to domesticated swine. Rabies control programs target populations of red fox (Vulpes vulpes) in Europe and North America, jackals (Canis mesomelas) in eastern and southern Africa, raccoons (Procyon lotor) in southern and eastern North America. In Central and South America, vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) and other bat species are killed in large numbers to reduce rabies infections among humans and livestock. Veterinary quarantine and control programs for wild animals have been successfully constrained or curtailed in some areas by strong public opposition, however. For example, efforts currently under way to reduce the incidence of Lyme disease among humans by the large-scale culling of whitetail deer populations in the eastern United States have been blocked in many localities as the result of political lobbying and legal challenges by animal rights organizations (e.g., Animal Protection Institute 1997). Conflict and contagionBreakdowns in medical and veterinary support systems during wars and civil conflicts have resulted in epidemic outbreaks of diseases within and among human, livestock, and wildlife populations (Lawrence et al. 1980, Kobuch et al. 1990). Recent outbreaks of several lethal epizootic diseases (monkeypox, Marburg fever, plague) in Central Africa have been linked to increased human consumption of species of wild animals (e.g., squirrels and rodents) as the result of wartime food shortages, coupled with the disappearance of preferred bushmeat species (primates, duikers) caused by overharvesting for the bushmeat trade (Fenner 1993, IRIN 1997, Dudley et al. 2002). The IranIraq war and the Gulf war precipitated rinderpest epizootics among livestock populations in that region, which may have been caused or aggravated by war-related displacements of pastoralists and their flocks (Roeder 1999).Disruption of government veterinary services during the civil war in Southern Rhodesia is believed to have contributed to epidemic outbreaks of anthrax and rabies among wild and domesticated animals in that country, now named Zimbabwe. Anthrax mortality among humans and livestock reached epidemic proportions in 1979 and 1980 and continued to proliferate for more than 4 years following the end of the civil war in 1980 (Lawrence et al. 1980, Kobuch et al. 1990). Control and containment of the disease may have been hindered by internal ethnic and political conflicts in the Matabeleland region during the early postwar era (19801984). Anthrax ultimately spread through six of Zimbabwe's eight provinces, with more than 10,000 recorded human cases before effective control of the disease was finally reestablished in 1987 (Pugh and Davies 1990). Although anthrax is endemic to the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe, where the outbreak first appeared and proliferated, widely publicized speculation has it that the 19791987 anthrax epidemic may have been linked to covert operations of the apartheid South African Defense Force, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization, or rival guerrilla factions (Carus 2001). However, there seems to be little evidence to support allegations of the use of weaponized anthrax against human populations in Zimbabwe, as the vast majority of documented cases involved secondary cutaneous infections resulting from apparent contact with diseased cattle (Kobuch et al. 1990, Pugh and Davies 1990). This interpretation appears to be supported by the subsequent resurgence of human anthrax in Zimbabwe in recent years (Mwenye et al. 1996), with nearly 1000 documented human cases and at least 11 deaths recorded in 2000 and 2001 (ISID 2001). Economic distress and the disruption of anthrax vaccination programs and veterinary services as the result of internal political turmoil appear to be important factors behind the current anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe, as was apparently the case during the 19791987 outbreak as well. Deteriorating economic conditions and food shortages seem to be driving villagers to risk disease or death from infections acquired through butchering diseased cattle for the consumption or sale of meat and hides (ISID 2001). Technologies and threatsThe threat of attacks with biological weapons has increased greatly since the ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1975. Although recent advances in biotechnology have augmented the potential economic value of the genetic diversity of organisms by enabling the transfer of genes between even unrelated species (Perrings et al. 1995), they have also increased the threat of their elimination through the use of genetically modified disease organisms as weapons of mass destruction. The breakup of the Soviet bioweapons program and the dispersal of its scientists and technicians may have heightened, rather than lowered, the global proliferation of bioweapons technologies (Bozheyeva et al. 1999). The basic techniques for culturing many bioweapon organisms are relatively simple, and microbrewery and pharmaceutical equipment, easily adaptable for bioweapons production, is readily available through domestic and international commercial markets (OTA 1993). The cost of developing small-scale but nonetheless sophisticated bioweapons facilities and arsenals is in the range of $10,000 to $100,000, an amount easily affordable for affluent and technologically sophisticated domestic terrorist groups like the Aum Shinrikyo or well-funded international organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah (USCNS/21 1999).Nevertheless, specialized technicians and state-of-the-art research facilities are not necessary for the production and deployment of many highly dangerous bioweapons organisms for clandestine, economically targeted assaults on agricultural crops or livestock populations (OTA 1993). Bioweapon cultures, diseased animals, or infectious materials could be easily introduced into international cargo transportation networks for shipment to the United States or elsewhere, with virtually no risk of identification or interception (Flynn 2000). The spillover of weaponized livestock diseases into susceptible wildlife populations could amplify and exacerbate the effects of initial attacks and create situations in which disease containment and control could become extremely difficult and total eradication virtually impossible (Daszak et al. 2000). There appears to be increasing interest on the part of international terrorist groups in bioweapons technologies and applications. There is evidence that bioweapon research facilities have been established in countries such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya that are known to have (or have had) cooperative or supportive relationships with international terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, we predict that runaway disease epidemics resulting from terrorist uses of bioweapons will most likely arise from accidental or inadvertent releases of virulent, broad-spectrum disease agents in developing countries, as the result of
Economic impactsThe recent outbreak of FMD in Britain demonstrates that even countries with a well-organized and technologically sophisticated veterinary services infrastructure are susceptible to introductions (whether deliberate or inadvertent) of highly infectious pathogenic agents into their livestock populations. The economic consequences of a disease epidemic affecting livestock are severe for any country, whether industrialized or developing. For example, the total costs of containment and eradication of the 1997 FMD outbreak in Taiwan approached $15 billion. Direct and indirect losses to the British economy associated with the 2001 FMD outbreak are expected to be $12 billion to $14 billion (OIE 2001). Losses in meat and livestock export revenue amounted to approximately $14 million per week. Estimated losses to the tourism industry because of restrictions on travel in affected areas were estimated at around $350 million per week in March 2001, or 25 times (2,500%) higher than concurrent direct losses in the agricultural export sector. Total economic losses to the national tourism industry during the peak of the FMD epidemic in March 2001 were estimated at more than $4 billion and are still rising (Dudley and Woodford 2002). The potential for catastrophic social and economic consequences from bioweapon disease epidemics is proportionally higher in developing countries, where doctors, veterinarians, antibiotics, and medical or veterinarian treatment and quarantine facilities are in short supply.Technical and logistical capabilities for countering the impacts of disease threats from bioweapons and emerging infectious diseases may be handicapped by the ongoing proliferation of drug-resistant disease strains of important diseases such as tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) and malaria (Plasmodium spp.). Improper use and inappropriate uses of antibiotics to suppress diseases and infections in both humans and animals are contributing to the emergence of drug-resistant strains of many important human and animal pathogens. The current widespread use of antibiotics in livestock feeds, now banned only in the European Union, may have serious epidemiological consequences (McDonald et al. 2001). Nearly half of all antibiotics used in the United States are dispensed in animal feeds, despite growing scientific concern over that practice (Gorbach 2001). Incomplete treatment regimens, inappropriate clinical applications, adulterated medicines, and both inadvertent and deliberate subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics are resulting in the evolutionthrough human selectionof highly resistant and highly virulent strains of disease organisms. In effect, the current situation represents an ongoing, essentially uncontrolled field experiment in the cultivation and proliferation of antibiotic-resistant microbe populations. This problem may well be aggravated by fear of exposure to bioterrorist attackswitness the panic-inspired purchases and consumption of antibiotics by American citizens after the anthrax attacks during September and November 2001. Subsequent events proved that such concerns were not entirely unwarranted5 of the 21 people known to have contracted anthrax as the result of exposure to contaminated mail subsequently died as the result of undiagnosed or tardily diagnosed pulmonary anthrax infections. ConclusionsThere appears to be little possibility for preventing bioweapon attacks against domesticated animals and the subsequent spillover of weaponized livestock diseases into wildlife populations. Bioterrorist attacks against livestock would not require access to weapons-grade disease strains or laboratory cultures; natural diseases that can cause catastrophic epidemics are common and widely dispersed within many countries around the world and are easily acquired. The ease and rapidity of international transport of potential human and animal vectors, coupled with the increasing virulence and variety of human-selected and human-engineered disease organisms, are setting the stage for disease epidemic scenarios that could equal or surpass those of any known historical incident. The United States must strengthen its capability for early detection of diseased animals, both wild and domesticated, and increase the availability of control technologies and containment facilities. Scientists and agricultural economists must communicate with policymakers and legislators to impress upon them the potential importance of spillover impacts of agricultural bioweapons on ecosystems and nonagricultural sectors of national economies.Our ability to understand and control the spread of diseases within and among human and animal populations is growing, but it is still insufficient to counter the existing threats posed by bioweapons and a growing number of newly recognized emerging infectious diseases. Interdisciplinary and international efforts to increase the surveillance and identification of disease pathogens, and to better understand the potential dynamics of disease transmission within and among human and animal populations in both industrialized and developing countries, will greatly enhance our ability to combat the effects of bioweapons and emerging diseases on biotas and biodiversity. Improved mechanisms for interagency and intergovernmental communication, cooperation, and collaboration are necessary to effectively combat and control the threats of bioweapon disease outbreaks. Expenditures on disease prevention and on containment and control infrastructure may prove expensive in the short term, but collateral benefits for public health and food security will greatly enhance the value of such investment to the national and global economy. Failures in the prevention and containment of bioweapon disease outbreaks could result in the erosion of genetic diversity in wild and domesticated animal species, the extinction of endangered species, the extirpation of indigenous peoples, and the destruction of human livelihoods and traditional cultures. AcknowledgmentsThe authors thank Mark Wheelis, Matt Greenstone, and four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on preliminary drafts.References cited
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Pigs killed during an outbreak of classical swine fever in Belgium in 1988. Photograph by H. K. Müller, Swiss Federal Veterinary Office
Pigs killed during an outbreak of classical swine fever in Belgium in 1988. Photograph by H. K. Müller, Swiss Federal Veterinary Office
Author notes© 2002 American Institute of Biological Sciences | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Covid-19 may be man-made, claims Taiwan scholar | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
As scientists, doctors, academics and conspiracy theorists toss around ideas and speculate on where the highly infectious virus originated, a professor in etiology at the National Taiwan University has claimed that the highly infectious virus could be synthetic in nature in other words, man-made.
Questions about the exact origin of the novel coronavirus have grown as it spread across China and then beyond. Hubei, the central Chinese province where it first erupted, reported 499 new cases on Tuesday, while South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Italy have become the new frontiers in the battle to contain the contagion. Speculation has grown about how the Covid-19 virus came into being. The official conclusion by Chinese authorities is that a dingy wet market in Wuhan Hubeis capital was the source of the respiratory pathogen as animal-human transmission could have occurred there. There has been much speculation about a virology institute in the city, affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, with rumors about a leakage due to slack management triggering a public health crisis worse than the SARS incident of 2003. Some of the more nonsensical talk includes a conspiracy theory that the United States made the virus to mass-infect Chinese people and stop the rise of its arch-rival. Now a professor in etiology at the National Taiwan University has claimed the highly infectious virus could be synthetic in nature, or man-made. Researchers likely synthesized the Covid-19, although more studies are needed to be certain, NTU professor Fang Chi-tai told a forum on disease control and prevention in Taipei held by the Taiwan Public Health Association earlier this month. During his presentation, Fang outlined several hypotheses raised by Taiwanese and overseas researchers, including the probability that the virus was man-made and was leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology due to gross mismanagement. Fang said the Wuhan facilitys biosafety level-4 laboratory was used to store, handle and research samples of SARS, Ebola and other deadly infectious viruses. Given Chinas poor track record of lab safety management, including a leakage of the SARS virus at a state lab in 2004, it is possible that a virus escaped from the Wuhan facility and resulted in the epidemic, Fang was quoted by Taiwans Central News Agency and the Taipei Times as saying. He added that analyses of the Covid-19 virus have shown that it had a 96% genetic similarity with an RaTG13 bat virus also stored at the institute, and that the Covid-19 could be manufactured by modifying the RaTG13 virus. Fang also revealed that French researchers had discovered four more amino acids in the gene sequence of Covid-19 than other known coronaviruses, which could be added artificially to make the viral transmission easier. Fangs theory is that natural mutations of viruses will only result in small, singular changes, and it is suspicious to see a naturally mutated virus suddenly take on four amino acids. Determining the source of the virus would have important implications for epidemiology, he added, saying that if the virus was indeed synthetic, then it could be easier for it to be eradicated. Meanwhile, Taiwans top research institute Academia Sinica said its researchers had already developed an antibody testing method for Covid-19 infection and made encouraging progress in synthesizing remdesivir, a medicine that many believe could cure the infection. Taiwans Center for Disease Control on Tuesday sent serum samples from three people who had contact with Taiwans first Covid-19 fatality to the Academia Sinica, as part of a joint effort to determine the source of that infection and if the three had developed antibodies. The initial tests showed that only one sample had antibodies for Covid-19 and SARS. The sample was obtained from a Taiwanese businessperson who was not listed as a confirmed case, as researchers believed his immune system had beaten the virus. Yet the institute said it was still a mystery whether a person who had recovered from a novel coronavirus infection could contract it again. Another team at Taiwans Institute of Chemistry has also succeeded in synthesizing 100mg of remdesivir. The synthesized drug cannot be used without the consent of a US pharmaceutical firm that manufactures remdesivir. It was reported that Taiwan was negotiating a technology transfer deal to start mass production of the antiviral drug. Remdesivir is a novel drug developed by the California-based Gilead Sciences as a treatment for Ebola virus and Marburg virus infections, and it has subsequently been found to show antiviral activity against other viruses. Based on its success against other coronavirus infections, Gilead provided remdesivir to physicians that treated an American patient infected with Covid-19 and was offering the compound to China for a pair of trials in infected individuals with and without severe symptoms. The mystery of how and where the virus started may take longer to discover than the cure. Read more: Coronavirus lab leakage rumors spreading Radical measures rolled out as Chinese cities battle virus Gaffes and blame: cadres in virus-stricken Hubei | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Explained: Scientific indications that show COVID-19 is man-made, Opinions & Blogs News | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Western scientists sympathetic to China and the obsequious media have expended enormous efforts to convince the public that the COVID-19 pandemic is a naturally-occurring outbreak of disease.
Included in that effort are restrictions imposed by the Chinese government on academic research related to the origins of COVID-19, in what is likely part of a wider attempt to control the narrative surrounding the origin of the pandemic. There are now rumours swirling within the global scientific community that Western professional journals are submitting to pressure from Beijing and refusing to publish data that do not conform to the naturally-occurring interpretation of the origin of COVID-19. The narrative promoted by the CCP is that COVID-19, while circulating in a bat population mutated, acquiring the ability to infect humans, which was then transmitted to people either visiting or working in the Wuhan Seafood Market. First of all, it was already known by the end of January 2020, that the initial patients hospitalised between December 1-10, 2019 had not visited the market and bats were not sold there. Despite the extraordinary propaganda campaign mounted by the Chinese government and its sycophants in the West, the origin of COVID-19 remains unknown and all of the structurally close bat coronaviruses so far identified to explain its origin have only raised more doubts. In the February 3, 2020 Nature article, scientists from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, led by Zheng-Li Shi, claimed that the coronavirus RaTG13, isolated from bats in Yunnan Province, China, showed a 96.2% sequence identity with COVID-19 and, therefore, RaTG13 is the closest relative of COVID-19 and forms a distinct lineage from other coronaviruses. A month later on March 17, 2020, the article The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2, widely-cited by scientists and the media, supported the conclusion that RaTG13 is CoVid-19s closest relative, which likely jumped from animals to humans in the Wuhan Seafood Market. It was later revealed that RaTG13 only existed on paper and was actually a duplicate of another bat coronavirus, BtCoV/4991, about which very little experimental data have been published. Nevertheless, if we use the RaTG13 sequence, which has provided the basis of Chinas naturally-occurring theory for the origin of COVID-19, holes begin to appear in its argument. COVID-19s receptor binding domain, which allows the attachment of the virus to a human cell, is structurally closer in its amino acid sequence to that of pangolins (scaly anteaters) than to bat RaTG13. COVID-19 N S N N L D S K V G G N Y N Y L Y R L F R K S N L K P F E R D I S T E I Y Q A G S T P C N G V E G F N C Y F P L Q S Y G F Q P T N G V G Y Q P Y Pangolin N S N N L D S K V G G N Y N Y L Y R L F R K S N L K P F E R D I S T E I Y Q A G S T P C N G V E G F N C Y F P L Q S Y G F H P T N G V G Y Q P Y RaTG13 N S K H I D A K E G G N F N Y L Y R L F R K A N L K P F E R D I S T E I Y Q A G S K P C N G Q T G L N C Y Y P L Y R Y G F Y P T D G V G H Q P Y As you can see, the pangolin sequence differs from COVID-19 by only one amino acid, while RaTG13 differs in seventeen positions. Within the receptor-binding domain there are fourteen specific amino acids that were previously shown to be critical for coronaviruses to bind to the angiotensin-converting enzyme-2 receptor that initiates the COVID-19 infection in humans. At least two pangolin species match those critical COVID-19 amino acids in thirteen out of fourteen positions, whereas RaTG13 matches only seven out of fourteen and other bat coronaviruses do so to an even lesser extent. Chinese scientists suggest that the pangolin receptor binding domain was donated to COVID-19, presumably through some type of recombinant event occurring between a bat coronavirus and a pangolin coronavirus inside a pangolin host. Their naturally-occurring explanation for the presence of a pangolin-like receptor binding domain is highly speculative and no evidence exists to support such a contention. A far more likely scenario is that the native receptor binding domain within a bat coronavirus backbone was artificially replaced with one from a pangolin strain. After that, came the insertion of the furin polybasic cleavage site, found in COVID-19 and none of the close bat coronaviruses relatives yet identified and a distinctive feature is widely known for its ability to enhance pathogenicity and transmissibility in coronaviruses. There is additional information now being discussed on virology blogs indicating that COVID-19 is not naturally-occurring because its differential ratio of synonymous to non-synonymous substitution is vastly different compared to that which occurs in nature among bat populations as well as natural factors that would select against the presence of a furin polybasic cleavage site. Chinas ongoing propaganda campaign and its associated Western censorship will not stop honest scientific inquiry from discovering the true origin of COVID-19. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed above are the personal views of the author and do not reflect the views of ZMCL) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
EU's Foreign Affairs Chief calls for independent inquiry into coronavirus origin | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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